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iv 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
The Appellant, Sherman Storage, LLC, ("Sherman"), is an Idaho Limited Liability 
Company which owns real estate in Kootenai County. Sprint Spectrum, LP., ("Sprint"), 
is a large cellular telephone company. Global Signal Acquisition II, ("Global"), is the 
successor in interest, attorney in fact, and assignee for Sprint. Global owns and 
manages cell tower sites. Sprint and the original landowner, The Wallace Family Trust 
("landowner") entered into a cell tower lease in 1996 called the PCS Site Agreement 
("Agreement"). The Agreement is a lease of real property for the installation and 
maintenance of Sprint's cell tower facility and improvements. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On May 19, 2009, Sherman filed the Complaint in this matter, seeking an Order 
of Ejectment, simply stating that Global's cell tower infrastructure was encroaching on 
Sherman's property on former 24th Street, and that Global had refused to move. On 
July 30, 2009, Global filed its Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, and 
Third Party Complaint for Indemnification against The Wallace Family Trust. On 
December 1, 2009, the Order for Default of The Wallace Family Trust was entered. 
After obtaining the Order for Default, Global entered into a Stipulation with The Wallace 
Family Trust and received an assignment of the cause of action to quiet title to the 
vacated 24th Street. Sherman was allowed to amend its Complaint after purchasing Lot 
4 from The Wallace Family Trust. The Amended Complaint alleged causes of action for 
ejectment, mesne profits, and breach of the PCS Site Agreement. Both parties filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment. The trial court issued its Decision on Summary 
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Judgment on October 4, 2010, ruling in favor of Sherman that the PCS Site Agreement 
was a clear and unambiguous contract, that the lease site was to be located only on Lot 
4, that Global's facilities were an encroachment upon abandoned 24th Street, and the 
same was a breach of the Agreement. R. p. 792. The matter was set for trial. Each 
party continued in its motion practice. The matter eventually came for a court trial on 
June 4, 2012. After trial, the court issued its Decision Re: Court Trial on September 19, 
2012. R. p. 1333. The court entered its Judgment on December 18, 2012. R. p. 1432. 
Global moved for attorney's fees and costs. R. p. 1348. The trial court granted the 
Motion and entered an Order for Attorney's Fees and Costs on December 18, 2012. R. 
p. 1439. Sherman filed a Motion to Reconsider, which was partially granted and denied. 
R. p. 1483. The court issued its Amended Final Judgment on April 18, 2013. R. p. 
1575. Sherman timely filed its Notice of Appeal. No cross-appeal was filed. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Sprint approached The Wallace Family Trust in 1996 for a proposed cell tower. 
Exhibit 49 pp. 49,-50. A representative of Sprint personally negotiated the Agreement 
with The Wallace Family Trust and represented that it would arrange and be 
responsible for all costs of construction, surveying, engineering, and title insurance. 
Exhibit 50 pp. 12-21 and Exhibit 49 pp. 56-57. In negotiating the PCS Site Agreement, 
the parties' intent was clear that only Lot 4 would be encumbered, and not the east half 
of 24th Street. Exhibit 49 pp. 49-50; 86-87. Sprint did not want to incur additional 
expense, and was only interested in paying for a lease on Lot 4. Exhibit 49 p. 55. 
Sprint itself stated that Lot 4 was sufficient to handle the cell tower lease area. Exhibit 
50 pp. 27-28. The parties' negotiations were consistent with terms of the final 
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Agreement. Exhibit 4 pp. 175-178; Exhibit 49 p. 47; Exhibit 50 pp. 19-21. The 
dimensions of Lot 4 exceed 3,000 square feet, and can therefore accommodate the 
requirements of the Agreement. Tr. Vol. I, p. 241, L. 21. 
At trial, Global did not present any evidence of the intent of the parties. Tr. Vol. 
II, pp. 258-9, L. 12-3. At trial, Sherman presented evidence of the parties' intent that 
was consistent with the terms of the Agreement. Exhibit 49 pp. 49-55. At trial Sherman 
presented a variety of exhibits that prove Sprint and Global were both on actual notice 
of the encroachment from 1996 to 2008, and the detailed efforts to keep the landowner 
unaware of the encroachment. Please see Sherman's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, R. pp. 1236-1247; Exhibits 1, 2 p. 756, 3, 5, 6 p. 89, 9 p. 4, 13 p. 
650, 14 p. 6, 17 and 19 p.2; and Sherman's Trial Brief, R. pp. 1028-1030. The evidence 
was largely unrebutted. In 1996 Sprint obtained but did not share with the landowner 
any engineering document, title report commitment, as-built drawings, site survey, or 
record of survey. Exhibit 49 pp. 100-106; Exhibit 50 pp. 26-27. Sherman presented 
evidence that in. 1996, Sprint had actual knowledge that The Wallace Family Trust 
holdings including abandoned 24th Street, and this knowledge came from Sprint's own 
commitment for title insurance and the Agreement. The commitment clearly showed the 
landowner's three different parcels, including 24th Street. Exhibit 2 p. 756. 
In 1998, Sprint obtained another title insurance commitment for the leasehold 
site that confirmed Sprint's actual knowledge that 24th Street had been vacated by the 
city, and that abandoned 24th Street should be included in the legal description of the 
lease. Exhibit 6 p. 89. Neither the 1996 or 1998 commitment resulted in the purchase of 
title insurance. In 2000, Sprint entered into an agreement with Ubiquitel, and provided a 
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legal description to Ubiquitel that clearly included 24th Street. Exhibit 9 p. 4. In 2001, 
Sprint entered into a co-locator agreement with Cricket. The purpose of subleases and 
co-locater contracts are to rent space on the tower to other cell phone companies. The 
Cricket agreement required land-owner consent, and Sprint used the correct legal 
description (only Lot 4). Exhibit 18 p. 841. The description was inconsistent with the 
title commitment prepared especially for Cricket at that time. Exhibit 14 p. 6. That 
correct legal description was never used again by Sprint or Global in a recorded 
document. 
Later in 2001, Sprint contracted with Verizon for co-location. The legal 
description in the document was blank. Exhibit 10 p. 1162. In the same year, Sprint 
prepared a landowner amendment to the Agreement related to the recent co-locator 
contracts. Exhibit 12. The landowner amendment failed to include any legal 
description. Sprint did not record this amendment despite that its normal practice was 
to record at the County Recorder's Office any amendments to the Agreement. Exhibit 
48 pp. 65-66. Th~ decision not to record the Agreement was made by Global's in-house 
legal counsel at that time. Exhibit 48 pp. 65-66. Later in that same year, Sprint 
amended the Agreement with the landowner for a second time. Sprint again failed to 
place the landowner on notice of the encroachment. Exhibit 16. In these two landowner 
documents, Sprint did not use the legal description simultaneously provided to Ubiquitel, 
Cricket, and Verizon, and confirmed by multiple title commitments. 
In 2005, Sprint and The Wallace Family Trust signed an Agreement Regarding 
Ground Lease. The document was prepared by Global. Global and Sprint are 
interchangeable for all purposes. Exhibit 34, pp. 3-5; Exhibit 48, pp. 67-69; Tr. Vol. II, 
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p. 269. As successor in interest to Sprint, this was Global's first document with The 
Wallace Family Trust. Global failed to provide a specific legal description, but instead 
attached the entire PCS Site Agreement and all its Exhibits. Exhibit 20 pp. 191-209. 
Next, Global prepared the "Site Designation Supplement to Master Lease". The Site 
Designation was a management agreement between Sprint and Global. Exhibit 21 p. 
113. It specifically acknowledges that Global had notice of the PCS Site Agreement. 
Exhibit 21 p. 119. It was Global's first opportunity to notify the public of the correct legal 
description of the PCS Site Agreement. However, Global researched, prepared and 
created a lengthy and detailed legal description. Exhibit 21, p. 120. Global and Sprint 
simultaneously co-authored the previous landowner Agreement and this Site 
Designation, but with different legal descriptions. Compare Exhibit 20 p. 191 and Exhibit 
21 p. 120. This new legal description by Global had never been seen in any 
Agreement, survey, title insurance commitment, or any other internal document 
concerning this site. 
The Site Designation alleges that the legal description of the Agreement is as 
follows: "A Leasehold Estate, said lease area being a portion of the following described 
parent parcel: 
Parcel No. 54-R: 
A parcel of land being Lot 4, Block 22, Glenmore Addition to Coeur 
d'Al~ne, according to the plat recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder in Book B of Plats at Page 123, records of Kootenai 
County, Idaho excepting therefrom that portion lying with in the right 
of way boundaries of Interstate Highway 90 as described in that 
certain Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation No. 
F17866 dated September 5, 1958, recorded June 16, 1060 in Book 
226 at page 304 records of said Kootenai County. 
Parcel No .. 57-R: 
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A parcel of land being Lot 3, Block 22, Glenmore Addition to Coeur 
d'Alene, according to the Plat recorded to the office of the County 
Recorded in Book B of Plats at page 123 records of Kootenai 
County, Idaho excepting therefrom that portion lying within the right 
of way boundaries of Interstate Highway 90 as described in that 
certain Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation No. 17866 
dated September 5, 1958 recorded June 16, 1960 in Book 26 at 
page 304 records of said Kootenai County." 
Global's new lengthy legal description required title research back to the 1958 
Decree of Condemnation for US90, yet without any reference to abandoned 24th Street. 
Exhibit 21 p. 120.' 
On July 25, 2005, Global recorded a "Leasehold Deed of Trust". Global needed 
the Deed of Trust to obtain financing of 850 million dollars through Morgan Stanley. 
Exhibit 23 p. 148. Global provided the newly created legal description to its lender. 
Exhibit 23 p. 152. 
On October 17, 2005, Global recorded the "Affidavit of Facts Relating to Title". 
Exhibit 24. The stated purpose of the Affidavit was to "clarify the record chain of 
leasehold ownership". Exhibit 24 p. 95. Curiously, there is no stated reason why the 
chain of title needed clarification in 2005. The new legal description was used. Exhibit 
24 p. 103. On May 23, 2006, Global recorded an "Assignment Agreement". Exhibit 
26. Again, Global used the same fictitious legal description. Exhibit 26 p. 165. Global 
used the legal description that varied from the PCS Site Agreement for these four recent 
publicly recorded documents. All of these recordings occurred after Global and Sprint 
had actual knowledge of the encroachment according to their own internal records, site 
survey, record of survey, co-locator contracts, and title insurance commitments. See 
Exhibits 1, 2 p. 756, 3, 5, 6 p. 89, 9 p. 4, 13 p. 650, 14 p. 6, 17, and 19 p. 2. 
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In 2005, the first and only actual policy of title insurance was purchased on the 
lease site by Sprint, Global or any co-locators. Exhibit 22. The title policy only insured 
the legal descript,ion recently created by Global. Exhibit 22 p. 65. Therefore, Global's 
four recent recordings would be insured, and any title search on 24th Street would not 
reveal Global's four recorded documents. 
Chronologically, the very next document was prepared by Sprint, despite 
Global's recent management contract. It was Exhibit A to the SLA, where the legal 
description now reverts back to Lot 4 and a portion of vacated 24th Street. The 
document was not presented to the landowner. This document was, of course, 
unrecorded. Exhibit 27 p. 918. 
Sherman 13laced Global on notice of the encroachment no later than November 
of 2008. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 77-81; Exhibit 30 a-j. Upon discovering the encroachment in 
2008, Sherman paid for a survey and a commitment for title insurance. Sherman shared 
both with Global. Global now had actual proof of the encroachment. Exhibit 29 and 39. 
After receiving notice of the encroachment from Sherman, Global ordered its own report 
of title insurance. Exhibits 30a and 28. Curiously, Global restricted the scope of the title 
insurance, starting from 7/25/2005 and ending on 11/10/2008. The dates coincide with 
the use of the newly created legal description. Exhibit 28 p. 487, and 30c. Usually, 
Global does not fimit the scope of title insurance policies. Exhibit 48 p. 41. Of course, 
this title report did not show the encroachment. With full knowledge of the 
encroachment and Sherman's allegations, from November 2008 to March of 2009, 
Global sought to modify and expand the PCS Site Agreement with The Wallace Family 
Trust. Exhibit 31, 32; Exhibit H-21. The cover letter was copied to seven people (five 
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blind copies) within Global. Exhibit 32 pp. 287-288. In the proposed modification and 
expansion of the lease site, Global sought indemnification from the landowner for 
Global's own encroachment even though at that time the landowner was unaware of the 
facts surrounding the encroachment. Exhibit 31 p. 235. Later, Global's representative 
denied sending the proposed Amendment to The Wallace Family Trust, and also denied 
authoring the letter containing his signature. Only at trial did he testify that in fact in-
house legal counsel authored them and he merely mailed them. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 306, L. 6-
25; Exhibit 31 and 32. When the proposed amended lease seemed unlikely, Global 
took a default against The Wallace Family Trust on their complaint for indemnification. 
They now possessed a court order indemnifying Global and holding the landowner 
liable for its encroachment. R. pp. 982-93; Exhibit 45. Shortly thereafter, Global 
executed a Stipulation with The Wallace Family Trust which assigned to Global a cause 
of action to quiet title to the vacated 24th Street. R. p. 333. The basis for the 
Assignment was the promise that they "would set aside the default Global has taken". 
Exhibit 50 p. 63-6,5, Deposition Exhibit 45(a). 
On the eve of the Summary Judgment hearings, Global tried to unilaterally 
modify the legal description of the lease to align with the PCS Site Agreement. Exhibit 
34 p. 1. A representative of Global had authority to sign for Global and Sprint. Global 
and Sprint are interchangeable for all purposes. Exhibit 34, pp. 3-5; Exhibit 48, pp. 67-
69; Tr. Vol. 11, p. 269. Global's representative signed without actual knowledge of the 
legal description on advice of in-house legal counsel. Exhibit 48 pp. 68-69. In Global's 
attempt to change the legal description of the lease during the litigation, it now 
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accurately (and for the first time publicly) uses a portion of vacated 24th Street. Exhibit 
34 p. 6. 
The trial court ruled as a matter of law, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d), that the plain 
language of the PCS Site Agreement is unambiguous as to the location of the lease 
site. The lease site is to be east of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right of 
way. R. pp. 812-14. Any portion of the lease site located upon the east half of the 
abandoned 24th Street exceeds the scope of the Agreement. R. pp. 813-14. The trial 
commenced with the stipulation to admit the voluminous exhibits of both parties. The 
primary trial testimony was from Sherman's managing member, Sprint's original 
surveyor in 1996, Global's current expert witness, and Global's representative. 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did Global Sufficiently Deceive The Landowner To Have Unclean Hands and 
be Denied any Defense in Equity? 
2. Were the Trial Court's Erroneous Findings Accepted and Relied Upon in 
Several Conclusions of Law? 
3. Is this Encroachment a Material Breach of the PCS Site Agreement? 
4. Was the Expansion of the Cell Tower Site a Result of Both Parties' Actions 
and Written Agreements? 
5. Does the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Apply to Lease Agreements? 
6. Did Global Establish By Clear and Convincing Evidence that Each Element of 
the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Applied to this Lease Agreement? 
7. Should Sherman be Awarded its Attorney's Fees and Costs? 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review 
This Court on appeal will set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they are clearly 
erroneous. Griffin v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376 (2007); I.R.C.P. 52(a); Neider v. Shaw, 
138 Idaho, 503, 506 (2003). In deciding whether findings are clearly erroneous, this 
Court determines whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent 
evidence. Id., citing In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 452, 454 (2001). 
Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. Id. 
Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, although conflicting, will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Id., citing Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794 (2002). A trial 
court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally construed on appeal in favor 
of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. Johnson v. 
Newport, 131 Idaho 521, 523 ( 1998). However, over questions of law, appellate courts 
exercise free review. Neider, 138 Idaho at 506; Griffin v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376 
(2007). 
8. Global Sufficiently Deceived The Landowner To Have Unclean Hands and 
Should be Denied any Defense in Equity. 
Sherman's successful summary judgment established that Global had breached 
the parties' agreement. The law of the case was settled, and at trial only Global's 
equitable defenses remained. Because of the conduct of Global and the protracted 
litigation, Sherman sought in its amended complaint to completely terminate the 
contract. The trial court largely accepted the equitable defenses offered by Global. 
Sherman argues that Global has unclean hands sufficient that it should be denied any 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11 
relief in equity. For Sherman's complete recitation of the relevant facts and analysis of 
Global's inequitable conduct, see R. pp. 1227-1253. 
The trial court's application of the equitable doctrines of equitable estoppel, 
laches and unclean hands is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. The 
denial of doctrines by the trial court will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of 
discretion. To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the court 
considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, 
and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lamar Corp. v. City of 
Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40 (1999); Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (Idaho 2004). 
The doctrine of "unclean hands" is based on the maxim that, "he who comes into 
equity must come with clean hands." Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 
137 (1983); Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (Idaho 2004). It allows a court to deny 
equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that its conduct has been "inequitable, unfair 
and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at issue." Gilbert, supra; 
see also Hoopes v. Hoopes, 124 Idaho 518 (Ct.App.1993). In determining if this 
doctrine applies, a court evaluates the relative conduct of both parties and determines 
whether the conduct of the party seeking an equitable remedy should, in the light of all 
the circumstance~, preclude such relief. Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378 (Ct.App.1997); 
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (2004). The clean hands doctrine "stands for the 
proposition that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his 
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the 
controversy in issue." Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success /nvs., LLC, 145 Idaho 
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360, 370 (2008) (quoting Gilbert v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137 (1983)); 
McVicars v. Christensen, No. 38705, Supreme Court of Idaho, February 20, 2014, 
Opinion No. 22 (2014). 
The analysis of unclean hands in this case looks first to the parties and then to 
their actions. The previous landowner owned and operated a mom-and-pop bowling 
alley near the location. After its sale the landowner rarely, if ever, visited the site. The 
landowner was certainly less sophisticated than Sprint. It struggled in keeping an 
attorney of record and was mostly unrepresented. It became subject to an order of 
default. Although The Wallace Family Trust struggled to keep up in the litigation, there 
is no evidence of any inequitable, unfair, dishonest, or deceptive behavior on its part. 
Sherman bought a storage unit business, coffee stand, and car wash. It has 
been forthright with information from the beginning seeking merely an ejectment as the 
owner of 24th Street. Based on the inequities between The Wallace Family Trust and 
Global and the need to secure its own future, Sherman purchased Lot 4 from The 
Wallace Family Trust. Ultimately, because of the actions of Global, as the owner of Lot 
4, Sherman chose not to do business with Global and sought to terminate the 
Agreement. Tr. Vol. I, p. 117, L. 12-16. In the alternative, it also proceeded with the 
ejectment claim as the owner of 24th Street. 
The cond':Jct and unclean hands of Sprint and Global directly involves this 
encroachment, and they should be denied any remedy in equity. Sprint and Global are 
large corporations with thousands of cell tower sites, many employees, and numerous 
in-house counsel. Exhibit 48 pp. 6-10, p. 35, p. 66, L. 9-21, p.68, L. 25. Sherman has 
exhaustively and, without exception showed Global's duplicitous conduct with publicly 
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recorded documents. Each and every publically recorded document or landowner 
document by Global fails to mention 24th Street or even that which attaches to Lot 4 by 
operation of law. However, each and every other document sets forth a correct legal 
description including mention of 24th Street. R. pp. 1227-1253. The difference in legal 
descriptions prepared by Sprint and Global is not a series of coincidence. 
To summarize the inequitable, unfair, and dishonest conduct of Global, it is most 
important to start with the fact that from 1996 Sprint was fully aware of the 
encroachment. All of their internal documents reveal the encroachment, and they didn't 
hide it from Ubiquitel, Cricket, and Verizon. Global is not an unsophisticated company. 
They were not victims of the encroachment. Exhibit 30b. When Global took over 
management of this company, they painstakingly created a new legal description. The 
artful creation enabled them to record a new management agreement and deed of trust 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The new legal description still satisfied its two 
main purposes: not encumbering 24th Street and not placing the landowner on notice. 
From 2008 Global treated Sherman the same way. They ignored the simple fact 
of the encroachment, and produced restricted title commitments, threatening letters, 
and stalled in order to renegotiate with the landowner. Exhibits 28, 30h, 31, and 32. In 
its negotiations with the landowner, it could not get a written amendment to the 
agreement. Exhibit 31. Therefore, it sued the landowner for indemnification. Using the 
default judgment as leverage, Global sought to litigate its way to the ownership of 24th 
Street by obtaining a stipulation from the landowner (a party opponent) that was in a 
poor bargaining position (already in default). R. p. 333. At that time it already had an 
order of indemnification for the quiet title action. Global sought to quiet title to 24th 
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Street in the landowner and be indemnified at the same time. Then Global could seek 
execution of the order for indemnification on the landowner's only assets: Lot 4 and 24th 
Street. Therefore, Global was litigating for the ultimate fee simple in the property 
underneath its cell tower. Global broke its promises to The Wallace Family Trust, and 
continue to hold the order of indemnification against it. 
Global's behavior can be portrayed as nothing but inequitable, unfair, dishonest, 
fraudulent, and deceitful as to the controversy at issue. Sherman made the decision to 
dissolve its business relationship with Global. In this case the trial court failed to even 
acknowledge Sherman's allegations about Global's deceptive behavior. Tr. Vol. I, p. 30, 
I. 18-20. The trial court failed to correctly perceive the application of unclean hands in 
relation to Global's equitable defenses as a discretionary issue, and failed to reach its 
decisions by the exercise of reason. 
C. The District Court's Finding of Fact No. 1 was Clearly Erroneous and was Relied 
Upon in the Remainder of its Decision. 
The record and trial testimony is replete with evidence that the cell tower 
configuration has· changed over the years. While it is true that the monopole has not 
moved since 1996, Sprint moved gates, fencing, and access, and the cell tower 
improvements are not in the same place as when constructed in 1996. Exhibits 11 p. 
141, 17, 49 pp. 94-95, and 50 p. 142; Tr. Vol. 11, pp. 190-191, L. 22-25; Exhibit E-12. 
The trial court confused the location of the monopole with the fence and buildings. The 
trial court's finding of fact number 1 states that "[t]he location of the Cell Tower Site has 
not changed since originally built, though fencing and access has changed, resulting in 
a 40' x 40' enclosure". Tr. p. 1335. 
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Sprint's original lease site was fenced 35' x 35' according to the as-built drawings 
of the site in 1996. Tr. Vol. II, p. 208, L. 4-10; Exhibit 3 p. 824; Tr. Vol. I, p. 63, L. 3; Tr. 
Vol. II, pp. 162-3, L. 18-15. Global's own expert trial witness noted the site was 
originally designed and built as a 35 x 35' fenced area. Tr. Vol. II, p. 190, L. 24-25; 
Exhibit E - 12. The original fence was not built adjacent to the curb of the abandoned 
24th Street, and was not an encroachment. Exhibit 49 p. 111; Exhibit 50 p. 23-24; Tr. 
Vol. Ill, pp. 297-8, L. 25-2; Tr. Vol. II, p. 208, L. 8-9. Global's representative admitted 
that the lease site has changed. Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 297-8, L. 25-2. In approximately 2001, 
the lease site changed from a 35' x 35' fenced enclosure to a 40' x 40' fenced 
enclosure. Exhibit 11 pp. 141, 143, 148; Tr. Vol. I, p. 89, L. 22-24, and p. 94, L 20. 
Sprint did not seek the landowner's consent or permission to change the fence. Verizon 
was also involved in removing fencing, constructing a building, and expanding the site in 
a westerly direction. Exhibit 11 p. 141 and 148; Tr. Vol. II, p. 198, L. 18-24. Exhibit A-4. 
There was little if any testimony or documentary evidence as to when the site was finally 
reconfigured in its current trapezoidal shape. 
The trial court was clearly confused. It contradicted itself on this matter and the 
decision is internally inconsistent. The trial court ignores its prior decision that the lease 
site encompasses all of Lot 4, and repeatedly refers to the expansion of cell tower site. 
Tr. pp. 1338, 1342, L. 12-18. This finding is clearly erroneous and inconsistent because 
the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the location of the original fence, 
the reconfiguration of the fence, when this occurred, and by whom. It fails to grasp that 
the fencing and building are the encroachment, not the monopole. This confusion 
carried into the district court's conclusions on each defense. 
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The trial court's finding that the location of the cell tower site "has not changed 
since originally built" indicates that the court further erred in not finding that the 
encroaching fence line occurred after the original construction. Exhibits 3 p. 824, 11 pp. 
141, 143; Exhibits F-2, F-3, F-4. This erroneous finding leads to incorrect conclusions 
of law, and this is shown in the first sentence of its analysis where the trial court states 
that "the cell tower site in its current location in 1996". However, the court goes on to 
contradict itself repeatedly by referencing that the parties agreed to the "expansion of 
the cell tower site to an area of 40' x 40' over a period of 14 years." Tr. pp. 1338, 1342, 
L. 12-18. 
It is true there is competent evidence that the monopole itself has remained in 
the same location since 1996. However, the ejectment claim is about the encroaching 
fence, not the entire site or its center point. The testimony of the witnesses, exhibits, 
and the court itself reference the fact that the fence has been relocated by Sprint and 
Global and any other finding would be clearly erroneous. 
C. 1. The Trial Court Failed to Recognize the Consequences of a 
Change in Fencing. 
The district court's contradictory statements (that the site is the same and that it 
has changed over the years) are found throughout its analysis of each defense. 
(1) The landowner "allowed for expansion" of the site to 40' x 40'. Tr. pp. 
1338, 1342, L. 17-18. 
(2) The subsequent written Agreements provide for the site in its "current 
location". Tr. p. 1339. 
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(3) The Wallace Family Trust and Global originally "built the Cell Tower Site on 
that location". Tr. p. 1342. 
(4) The Wallace Family Trust and Global "continually agreed and reaffirmed that 
the Cell Tower Site was in the location that the parties anticipated that it would be 
located". Tr. p. 1342. 
(5) The parties "clearly anticipated that the Cell Tower Site would be located 
adiacent to the area in dispute." (emphasis added) R. p. 1340. 
(6) The parties' actions and agreements which "subsequently fixed the boundary 
of the Cell Tower Site. Tr. p. 1342. 
If the record is clear regarding the change in the site, then the trial court erred in 
not establishing those findings. If the case is about the location of a fence, the fact that 
the fence changed is significant to each cause of action. No finding was made as to 
how many fence changes occurred, why, when, or by whom. Unfortunately, these 
contradictory ideas permeate the trial court's conclusions. Failing to make those 
findings of fact is clearly erroneous, and lead to incorrect conclusions of law. 
C. 2. The Trial Court's Erroneous Findings were Accepted and Relied Upon in 
Several Conclusions of Law. 
a. Substantial Performance. 
In its analysis, the trial court held that the landowner's "expansion of the Cell 
Tower Site to an area of 40' x 40' over a period of 14 years" somehow "renders 
substantial performance" of the Agreement and leads to the conclusion that Global's 
breach was immaterial. R. p. 1338. 
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b. Remedy. 
The trial court also held that the subsequent signed Agreements between the 
landowner and Global "remedied" the breach. However, the alleged "remedy" was an 
agreement to provide for the site "to be located in its current location". R. p. 1339, L. 10-
12. In Idaho law, forfeitures are remedied Scana, Inc. v. Greenwillow Trust, 133 Idaho 
263, 287 (1999), defects are remedied, Harvey v. Alturas Goldmining Co., 2 Idaho 510, 
523 (1893), and contractual defaults are remedied. Wilson v. Hambleton, 109 Idaho 
198, 200, 204 (Ct.App. 1985). The definition of remedy is the "rights given to a party by 
law or by contract which that party may exercise upon a default by the other contracting 
party, or upon the commissions of a wrong by another party". BLACKS LAW 
DICTIONARY, 6th Ed. The district court did not cite which specific part of the 
Agreements remedied the encroachment. The district court did not make specific 
findings how the encroachment was remedied. 
c. Boundary by Agreement. 
The court contradicted itself within this analysis by finding The Wallace Family 
Trust and Global "continually agreed" that the Cell Tower Site was in the location the 
parties anticipated, yet The Wallace Family Trust also allowed the site's expansion. R. 
p. 1342, L. 12-13, 16-18 .. 
d. Laches. 
In this equitable defense, expansion of the original fence by Global is an 
important finding of fact because it places the landowner on notice of the encroachment. 
The trial court failed to make a finding as to when the breach occurred and how the 
landowner was made aware of the encroachment. See Appellant's Brief, Section K, 
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infra The court stated that the landowner failed to assert its rights to the encroached 
area "even after Mary Jo Wallace was placed on notice when she viewed the cell tower 
site as built". R. p. 1344, L. 15-17. The court failed to specify if the landowner was on 
notice of the encroachment by the original construction, the first fence line, reconfigured 
fence line, or final trapezoid. The trial court also failed to connect the landowner to the 
fence or relocation of the fence in any way on any particular day or year. In other words 
how was it placed on notice? All of the fencing issues were solely constructed by Sprint 
without permission or knowledge of the landowner. 
From the onset, the trial court's decision was flawed. Its first finding of fact was 
clearly erroneous, and the trial court relied on that incorrect assumption in its 
conclusions as if it were substantial and competent evidence. Because that finding 
permeated several analyses, its conclusions regarding boundary by agreement, laches, 
immaterial breach, and remedy are incorrect. 
D. This Encroachment is a Material Breach of the PCS Site Agreement. 
The trial court stated that the cell tower site "as-built" does not defeat the 
fundamental purpose of the Agreement. R. p. 1338. The law in Idaho is that a material 
breach effects the "principal obligation" or defeats the object of the parties, despite 
honest efforts to honor the agreement. State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523 (2008). In 
this lease of real estate, the wrong land was used. Sherman insists that the land is the 
fundamental purpose of a lease of land. The trial court's rationale was that substantial 
performance was rendered in three ways: (1) the payment of rent; (2) the parties' 
agreed expansion of the site; and (3) the parties "appeared to remedy the breach". R. 
p. 1338. 
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D. 1. Global's Payment of Rent Does Not Render the Breach Immaterial. 
The trial court based its conclusion in part on Global's contractual payment of 
rent, which it determined was substantial performance of the Agreement. The logical 
conclusion is that the location of the cell tower site is incidental or subordinate to the 
main purpose of the Agreement. R. pp. 1337-8. The court made great effort to note all 
the rental payments to The Wallace Family Trust and Sherman. See district court 
findings of fact numbers 10-13. R. p. 1336. The court failed to realize that those 
payments were contractually obligated for the use of Lot 4. Sprint and Global did not 
pay any rent for the encroachment onto 24th Street. No part or percentage of the rental 
payments went to the owner of 24th Street. No mathematical formula could partition the 
rent received and use some of it to remedy a breach on another property. The 
encroachment onto 24th Street cannot be remedied by paying rent to the owner of Lot 4. 
The trial court failed to distinguish the two parcels, and that they were owned by 
separate persons at various times during this litigation. 
D. 2. The Parties Did Not Agree to Expand the Site. 
The court found the landowner received the benefit of the Agreement and 
"allowed for expansion of the Cell Tower Site to an area of 40' x 40' over a period of 
fourteen years". R. p. 1338. Upon this finding the court concludes the encroachment is 
an immaterial breach. First of all, The Wallace Family Trust fully believed they sold 24th 
Street in 2003 and stipulated to a Judgment in 2006. That is either seven or ten years, 
not fourteen. Secondly, the last landowner written agreement concerning this site was 
signed in 2005. That is nine years after the signing of the PCS Site Agreement. There 
was no fourteen-year period. 
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Most importantly, Sherman respectfully states that an agreement to "expand the 
site" could only occur if the PCS Site Agreement was amended in writing and signed by 
both parties. Exhibit 4 p. 1, paragraph 15(d). No evidence exists that the 1996 
Agreement was amended with regard to the legal description of the lease site. The 
legal description of the PCS Site Agreement has never changed. If the landowner 
"allowed" or gave such permission to expand the scope of the Agreement to account for 
the encroachment, then a new amended Agreement would exist. The distinction 
between material and immaterial would be irrelevant. 
D. 3. Global Did Not Remedy the Breach. 
Finally, the trial court found that three of the parties' subsequent written 
agreements, as prepared by Global, appeared to remedy the encroachment: 
"the parties' agreements in January 25, 2002, May 10, 2005, and 
November 13, 2008, appear to remedy the breach by providing for 
the Cell Tower Site to be located in its current location." R. p. 1339. 
Initially, this conclusion begs the question: How does one remedy an 
encroachment outside the terms of a written legal description? The district court 
provided no analysis on this point. In order to remedy a breach the parties must at least 
address the problem (the encroachment) in a written document that amends the legal 
description as found in the Agreement (to include 24th Street), which is signed by both 
parties and publicly recorded. However, the three documents cited are silent as to the 
encroachment, and do not even attempt to amend the legal description. See 
Appellant's Brief, Section G.2 c, d and e, infra. 
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E. Sherman's Status as Successor in Interest Does Not Render the Breach 
Immaterial. 
In support of its decision that the breach was immaterial, the district court stated 
"Sherman knew of the breach and the remedial measures taken by SSLP [Sprint] and 
Global since 1996. Sherman cannot now claim that the immaterial breach was not 
remedied at the time it took title to the property". R. p. 1339. 
It is true, during the litigation Sherman became aware of the encroachment and 
all the documents concerning this lease. It is also true that it came into contractual 
privity with Global in 2010 by the purchase of Lot 4. It is unclear how this knowledge 
would render a previous breach immaterial. Sherman was well aware in the purchase 
of Lot 4 that it was buying the good and the bad. The sale of Lot 4 does not wash the 
breach clean. Sherman steps into the shoes of its predecessor in interest in all ways. 
Sherman, as owner of 24th Street, is still entitled to eject Global. As successor in 
interest in Lot 4, Sherman inherits all the rights and duties as the landlord of the 
Agreement. Ow~ership of Lot 4 and the knowledge of the Agreement and subsequent 
documents cannot render the breach (encroachment on 24th Street) immaterial. 
F. The Encroachment Was a Material Breach of the PCS Site Agreement. 
In this lease of land, the wrong land was used. As a result, the encroachment is a 
restriction on the .private property rights of the owner of 24th Street. The fact that both 
parcels were at times owned by one landowner seems to have confused the trial court. 
Admittedly, that fact might, in some circumstances, render a breach immaterial because 
when an encroachment only concerns the original landowner's property, the neighbor's 
interests are not part of the analysis. However, when Sherman commenced this 
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litigation, it owned only 24th Street and had no contractual privity with Global. The 
ejectment claim was a simple request to "remove yourself from my property". It does 
not mean "move onto my other property". This point may be further highlighted by 
understanding that Sherman has other plans for 24th Street. Lot 4 is fully encumbered 
by the PCS Site Agreement. Its purpose is solely for the cell tower, and is not used in 
any other manner. However, 24th Street is part of the self storage group of businesses 
and has value unrelated to the cell tower. Its future development as part of the city's 
entry corridor is based upon floor area ratio and frontage on Sherman Avenue. In other 
words, each square foot matters. Sherman has the right to relocate Global's access 
easement to free 24th Street entirely. Exhibit 4 p. 184 (PCS Site Agreement, Ex. d.). A 
relocated access easement directly from Sherman Avenue onto Lot 4 would 
unencumber24th Streetexceptfortheencroachment. Tr. Vol. II, pp.160-161. Because 
the owner of Lot 4 and 24th Street became the same person during this litigation there 
has been confusion. The original parties contracted to lease Lot 4, and it is a material 
breach to use another's property. 
Secondly, this breach must have been material, i.e., important, because when 
Global became aware of the encroachment it made great efforts to keep that knowledge 
from the landowner. R. pp. 1226-1259. 
Finally, thi_s encroachment caused the entire litigation. The salient facts and 
circumstances of the encroachment were hidden by Global and took years to uncover. 
The encroachment stole the quiet enjoyment of the property for several years during 
this litigation, and according to the trial court now it permanently stole the property. 
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G. The Expansion of the Cell Tower Site Was Not a Result of Both Parties' Actions 
and Written Agreements. 
The district court concluded that the parties engaged in a series of "actions and 
agreements" in regards to the boundaries of the Cell Tower Cite. R. p. 1337. 
G. 1. There Were No Actions of the Landowner that Changed the Boundaries of 
the Site. 
The trial court did not specify which landowner actions affected the boundaries of 
the cell tower site. The only action really mentioned was the receipt of rent. The 
voluminous record and trial transcript is devoid of any evidence the landowner took any 
action (that was not in writing) that had anything to do with the fence or boundaries of 
the site. There is no evidence that they met at the site, joined in any repairs of the 
fence, or cooperated in any survey or landscaping plans. In fact, there is little evidence 
the landowner even visited the site after completion. 
G. 2. There Were No Written Agreements That Changed the Boundaries of the 
Site. 
The trial court concluded that the parties expanded the site by written agreement. 
R. p. 1336. The court did not make a specific finding of fact as to which agreement 
expanded the site. Therefore, Sherman will address each agreement listed in the 
court's findings of fact, numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. R. p. 1335. Sherman respectfully 
asserts that each of the new findings are inconsistent with the court's previous 
conclusions, unsupported by the record, and unsupported by the documents 
themselves. 
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a. The April 23, 2001, Amendment to PCS Site Agreement: FOF #2. 
This Amendment to PCS Site Agreement did not change the legal description of 
the PCS Site Agreement. Exhibit 12. The contract was merely to facilitate co-location, 
and did not contain any reference to a legal description or the boundaries of the cell 
tower site. 
b. The Sept. 19, 2001, Amendment to PCS Site Agreement: FOF #3. 
This Amendment was also for co-location purposes. Exhibit 16. This 
Amendment incorporated in full the PCS Site Agreement and its legal description. This 
Amendment did not refer to any other legal description, drawing, or boundary of the cell 
tower site. The Amendment did not change the boundaries of the site. 
c. The January 25, 2002, Memorandum Agreement: FOF #4. 
The 2002 Memorandum Agreement had as its primary function to relocate the 
access easement and reconfigure the site and its gates. That purpose is stated in the 
body of the document and in several places in the exhibits. Exhibit A-4. The 
Memorandum Agreement does not purport to amend the legal description of the site. In 
fact, the Memorandum Agreement specifically states that "in the event of any 
inconsistency between this Memorandum and the Agreement (meaning PCS Site 
Agreement) the Agreement shall control." Exhibit A-4 p. 1, paragraph 6. 
The trial court's findings regarding this Memorandum Agreement are inconsistent 
with its earlier findings and decision pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d). Specifically, the trial 
court has now made a finding that the exhibits "show the cell tower site located on the 
eastern portion of the formerly 24th Street". R. p. 1335. This is shockingly inconsistent 
considering all tlie prior litigation, the Decision on Summary Judgment, R. p. 792, 
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Memorandum Decision on Motion to Reconsider, R. pp. 1213-14, and the plain 
language and drawings of the Memorandum Agreement itself. Exhibit A-4. 
The Mem0randum Agreement makes two attempts to describe the site in a 
manner very consistent with the PC Site Agreement. It contains a written legal 
description in Exhibit "A" and a drawing in Exhibit "B". The legal description contained in 
Exhibit "A" merely states it is a parcel of land being Lot 4. This legal description is 
exactly the same· as set forth in the PCS Site Agreement Exhibit "A". Exhibit "B" is a 
CAD drawing very similar to Exhibit "B" in the PCS Site Agreement. The purpose of the 
drawing is to show the location of the new access easement. The drawing shows the 
lease area and abandoned 24th Street clearly separate from each other. Exhibit A-4 p. 
2. This drawing, for all relevant purposes here, has the same legal effect as Exhibit "B" 
of the PCS Site Agreement. Secondly, the trial court now finds that the 2002 
Memorandum Agreement "identifies the cell tower site as being located on a tax parcel 
number that applies to both Lot 4, Block 22, and the eastern half of the formerly 24th 
Street". R. p. 1335. The incidental inclusion in small font of an assessor's tax parcel 
number at the bottom of page 3 is hardly conclusive evidence of an intent to amend the 
PCS Site Agreement. Exhibit A-4 p.3. The Memorandum does not actually mention 
24th Street in any way, just the Assessor's parcel number. The number must be 
researched in the volumes of the County Assessors office to see that at one time the tax 
parcel number for the east half of 24th Street and Lot 4 were combined for tax purposes. 
In other words, at one point they were owned by the same tax payer. If this is relevant 
at all, it may be construed as a mere inconsistency, in which case the PCS Site 
Agreement would control pursuant to the Memorandum Agreement. Exhibit A-4 p. 1, 
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paragraph 6. 
Although previously litigated to conclusion, it still seems necessary to confirm the 
district court's previous ruling to the district court itself. The effect of the legal 
description was fully litigated and reconsidered to a final conclusion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
56(d). Global has previously and unsuccessfully argued that the 2002 Memorandum 
Agreement amended the legal description set forth in the PCS Site Agreement, yet the 
trial court repeatedly disagreed. R. pp. 1212-1214. The trial court's prior finding 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d) states: 
"The plain language of the Memorandum of PCS Site Agreement, 
recorded July 9, 1996 in Instrument No. 143059, is unambiguous. 
That is, the plain language of the agreement indicates the lease site 
is to the east of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right of 
way. 
Accordingly the court concludes that as a matter of law and for 
purposes of summary judgment that any portion of the lease site 
located upon the east half of the abandoned 24th Street right of way 
exceeds the scope of the PCS Site Agreement. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this litigation and pursuant to Rule 59(d)[sic], there is 
no c;lispute regarding the fact that Global's cell tower cite physically 
encroaches on property not contemplated under the original lease." 
R. pp. 812, 814. 
There is no inconsistency between the PCS Site Agreement and the 2002 
Memorandum Agreement. The purpose of the 2002 Memorandum Agreement was to 
relocate an access easement, not to change the legal description of the PCS Site 
Agreement. 
d. The May 10, 2005, Agreement Regarding Ground Lease: FOF #5. 
This Agreement allowed Global to assign some of its contractual rights to others. 
Exhibit 20. The- landowner also signed the document. There is an attached legal 
description in this Agreement: the PCS Site Agreement itself. Therefore, this document 
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could not change the legal description or the boundaries of the fence. The trial court 
has intimated that this subsequent Agreement affirmed that "no breach or default 
existed under the· PCS Site Agreement". R. p. 1335. This despite its previous ruling that 
a breach occurred pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d). R. p. 1337; R. pp. 800, 811-814. 
However, in 2005, when Global took over the management of this site, no party knew of 
the encroachment except Global. By signing this, The Wallace Family Trust is proving 
they did not know of the encroachment. Without full disclosures, the boiler plate 
language would be ineffective to impute knowledge or give actual notice of the 
encroachment to The Wallace Family Trust. This was an attempt by Global to deceive 
the landowner. 
e. The November 17[sicl, 2008, Letter Agreement: FOF #6. 
The November 12, 2008 letter sought an extension of the Agreement and a right 
of first refusal. Exhibit H-21. Interestingly, this letter was sent to the landowner 
concurrently with Sherman's communications that placed Global on notice (undeniably) 
of the encroachment. Tr. Vol. II, p. 281, L, 5-13. Because of its awareness of the 
encroachment and Sherman's allegations, Global inserted an indemnification clause in 
the proposed Amendment. Exhibit 31, p. 235. This letter was Global's attempt to 
memorialize the t_erms of a future agreement, or in essence it was written negotiations. 
The extension was never consummated. Exhibit 31. Because the extension never 
materialized, this letter cannot amend the terms of the PCS Site Agreement. However, 
the trial court now finds this letter amended the PCS Site Agreement by extending the 
lease "at the present location of the cell tower site". R. p. 1335. Nowhere in the letter is 
that language used or is the current location of the site confirmed. In fact, no 
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description of the site is ever mentioned. The letter only proposes that if a survey is 
needed, Global will pay for it. Exhibit H-21 p. 378. The letter was followed by the 
proposed amendment. Exhibit 31. In that proposal, Global seeks a "continuing right to 
relocate any or all of its equipment. .. to any other area of that parcel of land being Lot 
4. . . and upon such relocation the site shall automatically expand to include such 
additional area and such additional access drive, at no additional cost to lessee". 
Exhibit 31 p. 235, paragraph 5 (emphasis added). The proposal contained no other 
legal description. The trial court's finding that this letter concerns "the present location 
of the cell tower site" is not found anywhere in the document. Global even understood 
that and included its expansion language in the proposed amendment. The trial court 
may have confused the letter agreement with the proposed amendment. However, the 
proposed amendment was never executed. One final point regarding this letter is that 
in 2008 The Wallace Family Trust did not believe it still owned 24th Street. It signed a 
stipulation to the entry of the 2006 Judgment. Therefore, it would not have purposely 
contracted to encumber 24th Street. 
H. The Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Does Not Apply to Lease Agreements. 
The trial court acknowledged that the doctrine of boundary by agreement has 
only been applied in Idaho to adjacent landowners and never to a long term lease. R. p. 
1341. The district court still applied the doctrine to this case because this "dispute 
regards a fenced real estate boundary that has stood, and will stand, for a significant 
period of time." R. p. 1342. The trial court made no other analysis. 
The application of the doctrine to this case is a question of law and of first 
impression to the appellate courts of Idaho. This Court may freely review this 
APPELLANTS BRIEF - 30 
conclusion and draw its own conclusions from the facts presented in the record. Sim v. 
Daker, 154 Idaho 975, 976 (2013); Watkins Co, LLC v. Storms, 152 Idaho, 531, 535 
(2012). 
The district court cited Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9 
(2010) for the two elements of the doctrine of boundary by agreement: (1) there must be 
an uncertain or disputed boundary, and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the 
boundary. Id.; R. p. 1340. 
The Flying Elk case was a dispute over a sliver of land between neighboring 
landowners. A fence had existed for roughly 70 years, and had been built, moved, 
rebuilt, repaired, and relocated since the 1940s. Id. at 12. Because of those long-
standing actions in full view of the parties over many decades, the court implied an 
agreement from the parties' conduct. However, the court stated that mere acquiescence 
alone would not have been enough to establish a boundary by agreement. Id. at 13. 
The district court also cited the case Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264 (2005) 
which also involved coterminous landowners. There were fences that had existed in the 
same location for 40 years, yet neither party knew who built the fences or why. Id. at 
268-9. The roadways on this property were the exclusive way to access the appellant's 
property. The respondents removed a portion of the fence and removed the cattle 
feeder near the fence. Id. at 269. In addition to the prima facie case, the Luce court 
analyzed two presumptions that may apply to a long-established fence. First, when 
fence line has been erected, and "then coterminous landowners have treated the fence 
line as fixing the boundary between their properties for such a length of time that neither 
ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its location", the law presumes an 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 31 
agreement fixing that fence line as the boundary. Id. at 271. Second, coupled with the 
long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, the lack of any evidence as to 
the manner of its original location, the law will presume that it is originally located as a 
boundary by agreement if any uncertainty or dispute exists. Id. at 271-2. 
The Luce case chose not to apply the doctrine of boundary by agreement. The 
doctrine is "based on a reasonable assumption implied from the surrounding 
circumstances". Id. at 272; see also Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 400 (2001). 
The Luce court's analysis focused on the fact that the irregular shape of the property 
would make the assumption of an implied agreement unreasonable and that the party 
failed to present any evidence that the fence settled an actual disagreement or 
uncertainty. Luce. at 272. 
In the case of Griffen v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376 (2007), a landowner built a 
fence with the dual purpose of delineating the edge of their property and containing their 
livestock. Id. at 377. The fence was built in 1977, and the true boundary of the property 
was only described by a 1995 survey. Id. Despite the discovery, no objection was made 
to the fence until 2001, and litigation commenced only in 2004. Id. The Griffen court 
analyzed the doctrine of boundary by agreement, and although the case had a long 
standing fence, the court concluded that a period of long acquiescence by one party is 
not sufficient to overcome clear evidence of a lack of agreement. Id. at 378; see also 
Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 495 (2002). In addition, that case did not have a lack of 
evidence as to how the fence came to be located. The court concluded that a 
boundary by agreement could not have occurred when one of the parties intended 
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for the fence to be used as a cattle barrier. Griffen at 378. In other words, the fence 
was not solely used to mark the boundary of the land. Id. at 379. 
H. 1. These Parties are Not Coterminous or Adjoining Landowners. 
In the case at hand, we do not have adjoining landowners as in the Flying Elk 
line of cases. These are not two neighbors living in a rural setting. Global and Sprint 
never visited the site after construction, doing its work through subcontractors. In 1996, 
the landowners owned all the land surrounding Lot 4. Since the sale of land in 2003, 
the landowner moved out of the state of Idaho. The lease payments were passive 
income from property otherwise devoid of importance. In the appellate cases cited, 
supra, the parties were present and motivated to notice the fencing because they lived 
nearby and actually used the fence. In this case, there is no evidence that the 
landowner ever visited the site, monitored its construction, improved the site, or was 
aware of the fence's location or relocation. The relocation of the fences was done 
unilaterally by Global. The landowner lacked any motivation to care about the fence. 
H. 2. This Encroachment is Not a Long-Standing Fence. 
Unlike Flying Elk, Luce, or Griffen, this is not a long-standing fence. The original 
fence was built by Sprint in 1996. The fence was changed 5 years later in 
approximately 2001. The Wallace Family Trust transacted to sell 24th Street in 2003 
which was seven years from original construction. From then on they did not even 
believe they owned 24th Street, and had no reason to monitor the fence. 
H. 3. The Fence had Another Purpose Besides a Boundary. 
In this case, the fence per se is not the boundary for the Agreement. Neither 
party measured the fence to determine the lease. The PCS Site Agreement 
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encompassed all of Lot 4. The Agreement is Lot 4. Exhibit 4 pp. 175, 178, 182. The 
lease could occupy up to approximately 2,500 square feet of Lot 4 and be permissible. 
Exhibit 4 p. 173, paragraph 1. Sprint's fencing or reconfiguration of the fencing within 
Lot 4 would not violate the Agreement or even draw notice by the landowner. The 
Agreement was not defined by the original fence, or the reconfigured fence. The 
purpose of the high chain link fence and razor wire was not to define the lease area or 
provide a legal description. The various fencing was built to protect Sprint's investment 
and provide public safety, not to mark the lease boundaries. The reason the fence 
changed was because Sprint's needs changed and its co-locators' needs changed. The 
lease did not change. The lease boundaries did not change. Even if for argument's 
sake the landowner was aware of changes in the fence, it would not ascribe importance 
to the change in fencing because the PCS Site Agreement did not change. 
H. 4. There was No Uncertainty or Dispute Regarding the Boundary. 
For this doctrine to be applied to the facts of this case, there must also be some 
uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary of the PCS Site Agreement. However, the 
trial court has previously and repeatedly stated that the Lease Agreement was clear. 
The trial court again stated in its final decision that "the PCS Site Agreement signed by 
both parties clearly anticipated that the cell tower site would be located adjacent to the 
area in dispute." R p. 1346. The trial court stated Sprint built the cell tower on the 
wrong location. No other uncertainty or dispute was cited. A unilateral mistake in 
construction is not mutual uncertainty or dispute as to the terms of the lease. 
H. 5. The Parties did Not Make a Subsequent Agreement Regarding the Fence. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 34 
The doctrine requires some form of subsequent agreement, and mere 
acquiescence by-an absent landowner alone is not enough. The district court in this 
matter did not cite one action of the landowner that actually concerned an agreement or 
affirmation concerning the fence. The Flying Elk line of cases involved decades of 
farming, driving on or near the boundary, repairs, and an experiential knowledge of the 
fence. In those cases, the fence mattered. In this case, the trial court failed to find one 
relevant action concerning the fence. Even the subsequent written agreements 
concerning the cell tower site, discussed supra, did not concern the fence. Those 
agreements affirmed the PCS Site Agreement, not the fencing. 
H. 6. The· Luce Presumptions for Long-Term Fences Do Not Apply to this Lease 
Agreement. 
From the Luce case, the trial court relied upon two related presumptions that may 
be implied from a long-standing fence. However, the two presumptions cited by the trial 
court are also not applicable to the facts of this case. First, this is not a long-standing 
fence between coterminous landowners. This case does not have two parties treating 
a fence as if it fixes the boundary between their two properties. Sprint built the fence for 
its own purposes and changed the fence for its own purposes. Second, this case does 
not have a lack of evidence as to the origin of the fence. The fence was built in 1996 by 
Sprint. 
H. 7. The Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Does Not Apply to the Facts of 
This Lease. 
The rationale behind the doctrine does not apply to this case. These are not 
neighboring landowners separated by a long-standing fence. The landowner owned all 
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of the land under and surrounding the cell tower site and had no motivation in which to 
dispute the initial' placement of the fences, or their reconfiguration. The fence was not 
recognized as a boundary and its location did not matter to the landowner. The 
landowner only acquiesced in its location, but for a short time only. The short-term 
acquiescence did not have any attributes of an agreement between the parties. In fact, 
Global negotiated several actual agreements with the landowner that failed to raise and 
resolve any uncertainty. The facts of this case distinguish it from the appellate cases 
cited supra. The doctrine of boundary by agreement and its presumptions do not apply 
to this lease agreement. 
I. Global Failed to Establish By Clear and Convincing Evidence that Each Element 
of the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Applied to this Lease Agreement. 
If this Court on appeal concludes as a matter of law that the doctrine of boundary 
by agreement may apply to the facts of this case, Global still has the burden of proof on 
each element by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court's analysis of the first 
element curtly stated that the landowner and cell tower company built the site on a 
location not contemplated by the Agreement. R. 1342. No other evidence was cited to 
show clear and convincing evidence that there was any uncertainty or dispute regarding 
the boundary or terms of the lease by Sprint or landowner. It is undisputed that the 
boundary of the lease was clear, but that Sprint erred in building the fence or in re-
building the fence. This does not create uncertainty or a dispute. The only dispute 
arises when Sherman comes into ownership of 24th Street and requests to move the 
fence onto Lot 4. The trial court states the "boundary and location of the Cell Tower 
Site are now disputed by Sherman". R. p. 1342. (emphasis added) However, the court 
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failed to apply the first element to the original landowner. The doctrine is inapplicable 
directly to Sherman. 
Regarding the second element of the doctrine, the district court stated that the 
landowner and Global "continually agreed" that the cell tower was in the location that 
the "parties anticipated". R. p. 1342. The trial court relied upon the landowner allegedly 
entering into subsequent written agreements regarding the boundary. The 
inapplicability of each of those written Agreements as to the boundary of the lease was 
discussed, supra. See Appellant's Brief, Section G.2, infra .. These documents do not 
contain clear and convincing evidence that the landowner was made aware or 
acknowledged the encroachment, disputed the encroachment or the boundary, and 
agreed to fix the dispute by the recognition of the fence line as the new legal description 
of the lease. 
The trial 9ourt again references the normal rental payments as clear and 
convincing evidence of an implied or express agreement. Merely accepting the normal 
agreed-upon rental payments is not clear and convincing evidence concerning the 
second element of the doctrine. 
Finally, neither of the two presumptions regarding long-term fences (as set forth 
in Luce) were established by clear and convincing evidence to the facts of this case. As 
applied to this case, Global has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
each element of the doctrine, and in fact they have been rebutted by contrary evidence. 
Flying Elk at 14. · Griffin v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376 (Idaho 2007). 
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J. The District Court Failed to Find When the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement 
Applied to this Landowner. 
Which fence line does the trial court conclude is the boundary by agreement? 
The trial court only refers to two configurations: 35' x 35' and 40' x 40', but the current 
site is in the shape of a trapezoid. R. p. 10. The fence configurations were not part of 
any written document signed by the landowner that amended the PCS Site Agreement. 
Did the boundary by agreement occur in 1996 or 2001? The court failed to make these 
important findings 
K. Global Failed to Prove that its Encroachment was Known by The Wallace Family 
Trust Prior to the Litigation. 
In this case, the equitable defenses of boundary by agreement and laches 
require prior knowledge or experience of the encroachment by the landowner. You 
cannot have a dispute or uncertainty, and then agree to settle the dispute or uncertainty 
unless the party is aware of the encroachment. Likewise, you cannot fail to assert your 
rights without an awareness that your rights have been invaded. 
The testimony of the trustee of The Wallace Family Trust was exhaustive. The 
court's Decision states that The Wallace Family Trust knew of the encroachment, but 
provides no citation for such knowledge other than seeing the cell tower as built, and 
the written Agreements discussed supra. The reason the Decision lacks any citations is 
that they do not exist. On this element, Global's duplicity failed them. If they would 
have recorded any subsequent agreement using 24th Street, it would have been record 
notice to the landowner and the public. However, Global purposefully avoided recording 
any document encumbering 24th Street. R. pp. 1226-1259, 1028-1030. Therefore, none 
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of these documer)ts could place The Wallace Family Trust or any citizen on notice of the 
encroachment. The Trustee repeatedly and emphatically denied any prior knowledge of 
the encroachment and Global's great efforts to produce proof of prior knowledge failed. 
The best proof of the landowner's ignorance of the encroachment is Kootenai County 
Case CV 03-7690, the companion and consolidated case herein. That case was 
entirely about 24th Street. Had anyone known of the encroachment by Global, 
everything would have changed in that case. In that litigation, the encroachment was 
never referenced in any document, by any lawyer, or any party. That litigation lasted 
three years, and ·ended in the Judgment of May 5, 2006. R. pp. 45-6. The case had 
three attorneys of record, discovery, motions, and a stipulated resolution. The 
landowner had every motive and opportunity to bring to light any encroachment at that 
time, because it would have supported its main cause of action that it never intended to 
sell all of 24th Street. Although the trial court decided its 2006 Judgment was ineffective, 
it still serves as convincing proof that the landowner did not have prior knowledge of 
Sprint's encroachment at that time. The repeated testimony of the landowner in this 
case was undisputed. The trier of fact may not arbitrarily disregard the credible and 
unimpeached testimony of a witness. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 627-
28, (1979); Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 703 (Idaho 1998). Similarly, it has long 
been recognized that unless a witness's testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered 
so by facts and circumstances disclosed at trial, the trier of fact must accept as true the 
positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness. Id.; Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto 
Shop, et al., 58 Idaho 438, 447 (1937). In this case, the record discloses that none of 
the testimony from the landowner was contradicted or disputed by Global. Likewise, 
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missing from the .final decision is a finding by the trial court that the testimony was not 
credible. Therefore, the district court's factual determination that the landowner knew of 
the encroachment is unsupported by the record and is clearly contrary to the evidence 
presented. Without proof of prior knowledge, the defenses of boundary by agreement 
and laches fail. 
L. The Trial Court Erred in Assigning Notice to Sherman Itself. 
Admittedly, if laches is proven against a predecessor in interest, Sherman may 
be bound by such equitable claim. However, the trial court erred in assigning notice to 
Sherman itself. The trial court assumed that Sherman's purchase of Lot 4 in 2010 
placed Sherman on notice pursuant to a laches analysis. Sherman's purchase of Lot 4 
only means it purchased the land subject to the lease, acquired contractual privity, and 
was bound by the lease Agreement. In 2006, when Sherman purchased 24th Street, 
albeit with a cloud on title, it did not know of the encroachment or the prior written 
agreements between the landowner and Global because the numerous recordings did 
not reference 24th Street. Sherman became aware of the encroachment only in 2008. It 
immediately set out to fix the problem. Sherman never failed to assert its rights. The 
trial court erred in applying the equitable defense of laches directly to Sherman. 
M. Sherman Should be Awarded its Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
Sherman seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 
12-120(3) and the PCS Site Agreement on its termination of the Agreement based upon 
a material breach. In addition, it seeks to have the Memorandum Decision for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, and Judgment vacated. R. pp. 1439. For Sherman's 
analysis on the issues and basis for the attorney's fees claim, please see Sherman's 
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"Memorandum in Support of Objection to Attorney's Fees and Costs" R. pp. 1407-
1422. 
Apart from the breach of contract claim, Sherman's position is that its remaining 
cause of actions, ejectment and mesne profits, and Global's defenses were all in equity. 
Therefore, neither party should be awarded its fees and costs on those claims. The 
PCS Site Agreement would not be integral to the equitable claims or defenses as 
presented. The remaining claims are concerning 24th Street only. Lot 4 and the PCS 
Site Agreement are not the actual basis or gravamen of the equitable claim or defenses. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this case, Global's inequitable, unfair, dishonest, and deceitful conduct 
exposes that it has unclean hands and it should be denied any defense in equity. In 
addition to its conduct, Global has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that any of the equitable doctrines relieve it of its breach. Many of the district court's 
finding of facts were clearly erroneous and were accepted and relied upon in several 
conclusions of law. The encroachment was already determined as a matter of law to be 
a breach of the PCS Site Agreement, and it remains a material breach. 
DATED this ?'hay of March, 2014. 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 41 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
hereby certify that on the --;J 7 day of March, 2014, a true copy of the 
foregoing was: 
M mailed postage prepaid to: 
[)4 electronic - e-mail: 
Joel P. Hazel 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
fax: 667-8470 
J PH@Witherspoonkel ley. com 
Lora Henderson 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 42 
